ELSJ

Judgment, 04/06/2026, Rugu, C-722/23

On 4 June 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Rugu (Joined Cases C-722/23 and C-91/24), addressing an important issue in the operation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system: what obligations arise for the executing Member State when surrender must be refused because it would expose the requested person to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment?

At first sight, the judgment appears to follow the well-established line of case law stemming from Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ML, and Dorobantu. The Court reiterates that surrender under a European Arrest Warrant cannot take place where substantial grounds exist for believing that the individual concerned would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

However, the most significant aspect of Rugu lies elsewhere.

While previous case law focused primarily on the circumstances in which surrender may be refused, Rugu addresses a question that had remained largely unresolved: what obligations arise for the executing Member State once surrender has been refused on fundamental rights grounds?

The judgment does not alter the principles established in the Court’s earlier case law. Rather, it explores their practical implications. The Court makes clear that refusing surrender cannot simply bring judicial cooperation to an end. Where the executing Member State declines to execute a European Arrest Warrant because of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, it must nevertheless examine whether alternative mechanisms available under EU law may ensure the effective enforcement of the sentence.

In particular, the Court highlights the relevance of the instruments governing the recognition and execution of criminal judgments within the European Union. The protection of fundamental rights cannot result in impunity. Instead, national authorities must consider whether the sentence can be enforced in the executing State, thereby reconciling respect for fundamental rights with the effectiveness of criminal justice.

From this perspective, Rugu represents an important refinement of the Court’s approach to mutual trust. The judgment confirms that mutual trust remains a cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but it also reiterates that such trust cannot be blind. Where fundamental rights concerns prevent surrender, Member States are not released from their obligations of cooperation. On the contrary, they remain responsible for identifying alternative legal avenues capable of ensuring the enforcement of criminal sanctions.

The significance of the judgment therefore lies less in the recognition of a ground for refusing surrender—which had already been firmly established in the Court’s case law—and more in its clarification of the responsibilities that follow such a refusal. In doing so, Rugu further develops the balance between mutual trust, effective judicial cooperation, and the protection of fundamental rights within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

Far from being a revolutionary judgment, Rugu illustrates the Court’s continuing effort to ensure that the protection of fundamental rights and the effectiveness of judicial cooperation are not treated as competing objectives, but as complementary requirements of the European legal order.