Judgment of the General Court, Meta Platforms, Inc. v European Commission of 3 June 2026

On 3 June 2026, the General Court delivered one of its first significant judgments on the application of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) in Meta Platforms Ireland v Commission (T-1078/23). The ruling provides important guidance on both the procedural requirements governing the Commission’s enforcement powers and the substantive operation of the DMA’s gatekeeper designation regime.

Meta challenged the Commission’s September 2023 decision designating several of its services under the DMA, in particular Messenger and Facebook Marketplace. The company argued that the Commission had incorrectly concluded that these services met the conditions set out in Article 3 DMA.

The Court reached a mixed outcome. It upheld the designation of Messenger, while annulling the decision concerning Facebook Marketplace.

From a procedural perspective, the judgment confirms that the Commission enjoys a broad margin of discretion when applying the DMA and assessing complex digital market realities. However, the Court also emphasises that such discretion remains subject to meaningful judicial review. The Commission must provide adequate reasoning and demonstrate, on the basis of sufficient evidence, why a service satisfies the statutory criteria laid down by the Regulation.

This point is particularly evident in relation to Facebook Marketplace. The Court did not exclude the possibility that Marketplace could qualify as an important gateway between business users and end users. Rather, it found that the Commission had failed to substantiate that conclusion adequately. The judgment therefore reaffirms a fundamental principle of EU administrative law: even within the DMA’s ex ante regulatory framework, regulatory discretion must be accompanied by robust reasoning.

The judgment is equally significant from a substantive perspective. The DMA establishes quantitative thresholds that create presumptions regarding gatekeeper status. Once those thresholds are met, the burden shifts to the undertaking to rebut the presumption and demonstrate that the relevant service does not fulfil the qualitative conditions required by Article 3 DMA.

With regard to Messenger, the Court concluded that Meta had failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome those presumptions. In doing so, it confirmed that the burden of rebuttal under the DMA is demanding and that companies seeking to challenge a designation must present convincing evidence capable of undermining the Commission’s assessment.

An important aspect of the case is that the practical relevance of the Marketplace issue had already diminished before the judgment was delivered. In 2024, the Commission withdrew Facebook Marketplace’s designation after the service no longer met the relevant quantitative thresholds under the DMA. As a result, the annulment has limited immediate regulatory consequences.

Nevertheless, the ruling remains highly relevant. Its importance lies not in the current status of Marketplace, but in the guidance it provides regarding the evidentiary standards and reasoning requirements that will govern future DMA enforcement.

As one of the first substantive judgments on the Digital Markets Act, Meta v Commission offers an early indication of how EU courts are likely to approach disputes arising under the new regulatory framework. The message is clear: while the Commission retains significant discretion in identifying and regulating gatekeepers, that discretion must be exercised through decisions that are properly reasoned, evidence-based, and capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.